3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
959.
Lord Goldsmith
was not invited to provide draft advice on the legal effect
of
resolution
1441 until mid‑January and, at that stage, it was given only to
Mr Blair.
960.
Lord Goldsmith’s
position that a further decision by the Security
Council
would be required to revive the authorisation to use force
contained
in
resolution 678 (1990), although that decision need not be in
the form of a
further
resolution; and that there was no “room for arguing that a
condition of
reasonableness
[could] be implied as a precondition for the exercise of a
veto”,
is addressed
in Section 5.
961.
That
remained Lord Goldsmith’s view throughout the events addressed
in
this
Section of the report.
962.
Mr Blair
and Mr Straw repeatedly stated, however, that military action
would
be
justified if the Security Council failed, in the face of a report
of a further
material
breach, to “face up to its responsibilities”.
963.
In public
statements Mr Blair and Mr Straw continued to declare
that reports
from the
inspectors would be the basis for seeking a second resolution
which
was
regarded as an essential prerequisite for securing both UK domestic
and
international
support for military action.
964.
In January
2003, there was a clear divergence between the UK and
US
Government
positions over the timetable for military action.
965.
The
decisions to deploy military forces to the Gulf and the
absence
of collective
discussion of the implications are addressed in Sections 6
and 7.
966.
On 24
January, Mr Blair sent President Bush a proposal suggesting
the
inspectors
should be given until the end of March or early April to carry out
their
task and
asking for fortnightly reports to the Security Council on the
extent of
Iraqi
compliance.
967.
Mr Blair
considered that, if those reports established a pattern
of
non‑compliance,
they would, in the absence of other evidence that Iraq
had
concealed
WMD (a “smoking gun”), be sufficient to secure Security
Council
support for
a second resolution.
968.
The US and
UK should seek to persuade others, including Dr Blix, that
that
was the
“true view” of resolution 1441.
969.
By the end
of January, Mr Blair had taken a public position that
Iraq
was failing
fully to comply with resolution 1441, and that that was a
further
material breach.
970.
Mr Blair
and Mr Straw saw the meeting with President Bush on 31
January
as the best
opportunity to gain US support for an approach designed to
secure
a second
resolution.
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