The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
971.
The Inquiry
recognises that events were moving fast and that Mr Blair
was
seeking to
influence President Bush’s position.
972.
President
Bush agreed to seek a second resolution to help Mr Blair,
but
there were
major reservations within the US Administration about the
wisdom
of that
approach.
973.
Mr Blair
confirmed that he was “solidly with the President and
ready
to do whatever
it took” to disarm Saddam Hussein.
974.
But
President Bush was not prepared to agree a timetable which
would
preclude US
military action in early March.
975.
Mr Blair’s
proposed approach to the discussion with President Bush
was
discussed
in a meeting of Ministers before Cabinet on 30 January and
then
discussed
in general terms in Cabinet itself. But no detailed and in depth
analysis
of the
strategy and its advantages and disadvantages, including the
likelihood
of success,
was prepared or discussed collectively by either senior
officials
or Ministers.
Nor were alternative options, which might have been
available
to the UK
at that stage, identified and considered.
976.
A review of
the strategy would inevitably have focused on the
tension
between the
military timetable of the United States and the UK view that
the
inspections
needed more time before it would be possible to secure
international
support and
a further UN Security Council resolution.
977.
In the
event, the approach failed to secure majority support in the
Security
Council in
mid‑March for a resolution stating that Iraq had failed to take the
final
opportunity
offered by resolution 1441; that the inspections had run their
course;
and that
military action was necessary as a last resort to disarm Saddam
Hussein
of his
weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery. That
is
addressed
in subsequent Sections of the Report.
176