3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
•
A second UN
resolution would be the “Basis for this approach”. It
would
“transform
the politics in the UK, Europe and the wider world” and it “might
even
produce an
implosion in Iraq”.
•
It would
“take an effort to get the nine positive votes
needed”.
•
Moderate
Arabs might support military action “when the time comes”, but
they
would need
“a second resolution and wider international support for force,
as
well as
being seen to give Saddam Hussein one last chance to climb
down”.
•
All the
trends pointed to “a crunch time around end March”. The FCO did
not
see how a
second resolution could be obtained “in the next few weeks,
absent
a dramatic
new fact”.
•
The UK was
with the US “100% on the goal; full disarmament by force
and
regime
change if necessary. But we have to contrive circumstances in
which
we can
carry a broad coalition and domestic opinion with us.”
•
Working
with the UN would “produce a huge prize” in relation to
rebuilding
Iraq with
international support “which allows us to exit”, sending a
“powerful
message” to
other “would be proliferators”, and that domestic opinion
would
be “more
convinced by the legal case”. That was “worth taking time
over”.
•
There was
merit in the Saudis’ idea for Arab League pressure on
Saddam
to go and
the idea of a “UN trusteeship” was “worth close
examination”.
•
An overall
“winning concept” was needed which “should embrace both
military
action and
‘day‑after’ administration in Iraq”. It would be “pointless
and
damaging to
win war and lose peace”.
•
It would be
“irresponsible to abandon Iraq quickly after toppling
Saddam”.
The “risk
of civil war would be real” and “Iraq’s neighbours would get
dragged
in, creating
instability in the whole region”.
•
Coalition
Forces would “not be seen as liberators for long, if at all. Our
motives
are
regarded with huge suspicion. The Iraqis … want us gone quickly.
Our
occupation
and administration of Iraq will become more unpopular and
its
awfulness
more debatable, the longer it continues.”
•
The “Blunt
fact” was “that in those circumstances any reforms are
unlikely
to stick.
Iraqis will need legitimate international presence holding the
ring
while they
themselves set up new, Iraqi, structures.”
•
The period
of “government by military coalition” should be kept “as
short
as possible”
and an “international administration with UN blessing”
introduced “quickly”.
•
Restoring
the oil production would be “an immediate challenge”. The
oil
sector would
“need some technology and a lot of capital”. The US and
UK
should
“encourage an open investment regime and a level playing field
for
foreign
companies”.
•
The UK
media and Parliament had “not yet focused on day‑after
questions.
But it
would be very difficult to sustain a UK contribution to day‑after
if our
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