The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
“Preparations
for a possible attack on Israel” were “likely to be more extensive
and
to stretch
Iraqi capabilities to the limit”.
•
There were
indications of “plans to sabotage oil fields to prevent them
falling into
Coalition
hands”.
Maintaining
control within Iraq
The
Assessment stated:
•
The regime
continued to “maintain
regime cohesion primarily through
intimidation”.
•
It had
“attempted to maintain its hold by claiming” that the return of
inspectors had
“averted a
US attack”; the international community was “intent on disarming
Iraq,
not on
regime change”; the regime was “maintaining ‘business as usual’:
anybody
thinking of
deserting will face serious consequences”.
•
Clear signs of
dissent or defection might not be seen until the regime was
“about
to fall”.
•
Saddam Hussein
had “sought to mitigate the regime’s unpopularity by
promising
some
measures of liberalisation”. Such measures had “little credibility”
as the
regime had
“made them under pressure in the past, then withdrawn them once
the
crisis has
passed”.
•
There was
“little intelligence on Iraqi popular attitudes towards a Coalition
attack”.
•
The JIC judged
that “most Iraqis will welcome the departure of Saddam. A
few
reports
suggest that some Iraqis may fight to defend their homeland from
what
they see as
external aggression. [...] Overall we judge that while
Iraqis may not
welcome
military forces, they will at least acquiesce in Coalition
military
action to
topple the regime, as long as civilian casualties are
limited.”
•
Morale in much
of the regular army was “low” and “many soldiers” were
“reluctant
to fight”.
“But as long as Iraqi security officers remain with military units
and able
to enforce
discipline, fear of execution is likely to keep regular units at
their posts.”
Saddam
Hussein’s mindset
The
Assessment stated:
•
The JIC judged
that Saddam Hussein was “still in
control” and was
“unlikely
to
relinquish
power voluntarily”.
•
Saddam Hussein
would “fear the humiliation of exile, possible assassination
and
the threat
of trial before an international war crimes tribunal”. Suggesting
to him
“that he
step down to avert a war would be likely to provoke a murderous
rage”.
•
The prospects
for a “Turkish initiative to promote a regional peace plan” did
not
“look
good”. There had been “no indication” that Saddam was “preparing to
flee”.
There had
been “uncorroborated reports of plans for Saddam’s family to
seek
refuge
abroad in the event of a Coalition attack”.
•
Saddam Hussein
was “under increasing pressure” as the inspections
regime
intensified,
UNMOVIC had made “significant discoveries” and the Coalition
military
build‑up
continued.
•
The JIC judged
that Saddam Hussein had “underestimated UNMOVIC’s
capability
to expose
his deception”. He had “failed to realise that he was facing a
situation
different
from the days of UNSCOM”. UNMOVIC’s “limited success”
highlighted
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