3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
Iraq and
terrorism
Addressing
Iraq’s capability to conduct terrorist attacks and its possible
intentions, the
Assessment
stated:
•
The JIC
continued to judge that Iraq’s capability to conduct terrorist
attacks was
“limited,
especially outside the Gulf region”.
•
The JIC had
“previously judged that terrorism could be attempted against
Coalition
Forces
during a military build‑up if Saddam believed an attack was
inevitable.
There [had]
been no indication that Iraq was behind the recent attack on
US
contractors
… in Kuwait”. That had, however, highlighted “the vulnerability of
the
large
numbers of Coalition Forces concentrated in an area as small as
Kuwait”.
•
Iraq might
“well seek to use its influence over some smaller militant
Palestinian
groups to
encourage them to strike at US and Coalition interests in the
Middle
East in the
event of a Coalition attack”.
•
There were
“also uncorroborated reports of Iraq assembling teams in
various
countries
to attack UK and US interests in the event of war against
Iraq.
•
Despite the
presence of terrorists in Iraq with links to Al Qaida, there
was
“no intelligence
of current co‑operation between Iraq and Al Qaida”.
Iraqi
military preparations
The
Assessment stated:
•
There were
“continuing military defensive preparations, including
deployments
and
reinforcement of military units in the South, West and along the
border of the
Kurdish
autonomous zone” which appeared to be “directed against both the
threat
of [an]
internal uprising and external attack”.
•
“Since early
January part of the Iraqi 4th Corps has moved southwards,
including
possibly
1,000 troops on the al‑Faw Peninsula, apparently in response to
the
Coalition
build‑up in Kuwait.”
•
But Iraq’s
options for redeployment in the South were “limited”: “Any
significant
redeployment
in the South would risk triggering a Coalition attack by
breaching
the
southern No‑Drive Zone.”
•
The regime did
“not trust the Republican Guard enough to deploy them
in
Baghdad,
except possibly as a last resort, leaving them exposed beyond
the
capital’s
boundaries”.
•
Iraqi
preparations in and around Baghdad were judged to be “of limited
utility”.
•
There had been
“no clear indication of any plan for a pre‑emptive military
strike
against the
Kurds, neighbouring countries or Israel”.
•
Saddam Hussein
would have “little incentive to launch such a strike while
the
Iraqi
strategy focuses on convincing UNMOVIC that Iraq does not have
WMD
holdings”,
but it might “become an attractive option in the face of
imminent
Coalition
military action”.
•
There was
“unlikely” to be “any advance warning of a pre‑emptive attack on
the
Kurds”.
•
A “pre‑emptive
limited artillery strike on Kuwait using CBW could be launched
in
as little
as two hours”.
147