The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
“Saddam
probably believes he has some strong political and military cards
to
play, even
in the face of an inevitable attack. These include exploiting
international
divisions
over war with Iraq and rousing the Arab street. He may use
human
shields,
fire CBW against Coalition Forces, launch a pre‑emptive attack on
the
Kurds,
Coalition Forces building up in Kuwait or Israel, or sabotage Iraqi
oil wells
and
water supply.”
Inspections
The JIC had
“judged in October” that:
“Saddam was
confident he could prevent UNMOVIC from finding any
evidence
before
military options started to close off … and that concealment and
dispersal
of
sensitive items were the basis of Iraq’s strategy. [...] But by
mid‑January there
were signs
that Iraq was coming under pressure from UNMOVIC finds that
were
inconsistent
with its December 2002 declaration. [...]
“[...]
Intelligence is unclear, but it is possible the UNMOVIC discoveries
have
increased
Iraqi uncertainty. Blix’s tough statement to the Security Council
on
27 January
surprised Baghdad and may have increased the regime’s concerns
about
UNMOVIC.
Saddam Hussein continues to believe that the possession of WMD is
a
vital Iraqi
interest. [...] Any WMD admission would therefore be tactical
rather than
indicative
of a genuine change of policy.”
Reading the
outside world
The JIC
assessed that:
•
Iraqi
officials were “increasingly
convinced of the inevitability of a US‑led
military
attack”.
•
Saddam Hussein
continued to “give the impression that military action,
though
increasingly
likely,” was “not imminent”.
•
Saddam
Hussein’s speeches in early January had been “bellicose, calling
for
bravery and
sacrifice in defending the homeland from invaders”.
•
It was “not
clear that Saddam and his officials” had “fully grasped the
severity of
the
military attack they face from the US‑led Coalition assembling in
the Gulf”. [...]
•
“Reporting …
indicated” that Iraq believed the West was “squeamish
about
casualties”.
•
Saddam Hussein
was “misreading the
international scene”. Media
reporting of
debate in
the West might “well lead him to overestimate the impact of
opposition
to military
action on US determination to deal decisively with
him”.
•
Saddam Hussein
might “also be unsure whether the aim of the Coalition
[was]
regime
change and
disarmament
or just disarmament”.
•
Iraq
“continued to seek support from Russia and China as well as Arab
and
Muslim
states. But such attempts to gather Arab and international
support
appear
overambitious.”
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