The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
From the
end of September, Mr Blair was advised that a second decision
by the
Security
Council would be needed to authorise military action.
1094.
Mr Straw
and Sir David Manning advised Mr Blair that tough messages
were
required to
persuade President Bush to accept the UK position and to address
the
difficulties
for the UK that the US stance might create. He was encouraged to
try
to get the
US to agree to two resolutions.
1095.
Between 2
and 17 October, Mr Blair made a series of decisions
which
aligned the
UK with the declared US position that no further decision by
the
Security
Council could be explicitly conceded in the
negotiation.
1096.
To maintain
pressure on Iraq, Mr Blair and Mr Straw decided on 17
October
not to
address the question of a second resolution at that
time.
1097.
The effect
of the policy was that if a material breach of the resolution
was
reported to
the Security Council, Saddam Hussein would not get a second
chance.
1098.
But
Mr Blair, Mr Straw and other senior UK participants in
the negotiation
of
resolution 1441 envisaged that, in the event of a material breach
of Iraq’s
obligations,
a second resolution determining that a breach existed
and
authorising
the use of force was likely to be tabled in the Security
Council.
1099.
The pursuit
of a possible “side agreement” to that end,
Mr Straw’s
conversations
with Secretary Powell and Mr de Villepin, and Sir
Jeremy
Greenstock’s
suggestion that the UK might table such a resolution all confirm
that
conclusion.
1100.
Mr Blair
and Mr Straw were, however, concerned that it might be
difficult to
secure
agreement to a second resolution within the Council and that one or
more
of the
Permanent Members might veto the resolution.
1101.
In those
circumstances, Mr Blair’s and Mr Straw’s position was
that if the
Security
Council failed to meet its responsibilities, military force should
be used
to disarm
Iraq. Mr Blair had already assured President Bush on several
occasions
that the UK
would take such action.
1102.
Mr Blair
framed that in terms of the “Kosovo option” and what
would
happen in
the event of an “unreasonable” veto.
1103.
Mr Straw
told Lord Goldsmith that he accepted a second resolution
would
be needed
“unless circumstances changed”, but he argued that could not
be
acknowledged
publicly for tactical reasons.
1104.
Lord
Goldsmith informed Mr Blair on 22 October that, although he
would
not be able
to give a final view until the resolution was adopted, the draft of
the
resolution
of 19 October would not on its own authorise military
action.
388