3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
1084.
A new
resolution would not have been required to permit UNMOVIC
and
the IAEA to
operate in Iraq. The UK and the US had, however, already agreed
that
the
provisions of resolution 1284 (1999) were no longer sufficient to
secure the
disarmament
of Iraq and a strengthened inspections regime would be
required.
A new
resolution would maintain the pressure on Iraq and define a more
intrusive
inspections
regime allowing the inspectors unconditional and unrestricted
access
to all
Iraqi facilities.
1085.
Iraq’s
letters of 16 and 19 September to the Security Council
declaring
that Iraq
was “totally clear of all nuclear, chemical and biological weapons”
and
Saddam
Hussein’s rebuttal of suggestions that Iraq might share such
weapons
with Al
Qaida were immediately discounted. In response to Iraq’s detailed
rebuttal
of the UK
dossier, the Assessments Staff concluded that there was no need
for
a full
reply to Iraq’s claims.
1086.
The
negotiation of resolution 1441 reflected a broad consensus in
the
United
Nations Security Council on the need to achieve the disarmament of
Iraq.
1087.
There were,
however, significant differences between the US and UK
positions:
and between them and China, France and Russia about the
substance
of the
strategy to be adopted, including the role of the Security Council
in
determining
whether peaceful means had been exhausted and the use of
force
to secure
disarmament was justified.
1088.
Those
differences resulted in difficult negotiations over more
than
eight weeks
before the eventual unanimous adoption of resolution 1441
on
8 November
2002.
1089.
In
September and October 2002 negotiations were being
conducted
simultaneously
at three separate levels: discussions between Heads of State
and
Government
and their advisers; between foreign ministers; and in New
York.
1090.
The degree
to which Mr Blair, Mr Straw and Sir David Manning, and
their
counterparts
in other capitals, were directly engaged in the detailed
negotiations
with
counterparts in other capitals was highly unusual and demonstrated
the
difficulty
and political sensitivity of the issues under
discussion.
1091.
Mr Blair
played an active role in determining the UK’s negotiating
strategy
and seeking
to influence President Bush, President Chirac and President
Putin.
1092.
Within the
UK’s overarching objective, the initial discussion of
the
resolution
focused on the crucial need to revive UN authority to permit UK
use
of military
force if coercive diplomacy failed.
1093.
Mr Blair
was advised that it would be impossible to get agreement in
the
Security
Council to a single resolution unequivocally providing that
authority.
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