3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
1105.
The way in
which the legal advice was sought and considered
during
the
negotiation of resolution 1441, and the substance of that advice,
including
Lord
Goldsmith’s views on the legal effects of the drafts he saw and
whether
there was
any reason for the Government to assume that the resolution
adopted
on
8 November could by itself provide the authority for the use
of force, are
addressed
earlier in this Section.
1106.
Decisions
made by Mr Blair at key stages in the negotiations limited
the
policy
options subsequently available to the UK.
1107.
In seeking
to influence President Bush’s decisions, Mr Blair offered
the
UK’s support
while suggesting possible adjustments to the US
position.
1108.
In his
discussions with President Bush, Mr Blair did not seek to use
the
potential
UK military contribution to influence the US during the
negotiation
of resolution
1441.
1109.
The way in
which the decision on 31 October to offer significant
forces
for ground
operations to the US for planning purposes was taken is
addressed
in Section
6.1.
1110.
The UK was
successful in changing some aspects of the US position
during the
negotiations, in particular ensuring resolution 1441 was based on
the
disarmament
of Iraq rather than wider issues as originally proposed by the
US.
1111.
Initial
US/UK drafts of the resolution which would not be acceptable to
other
members of
the Security Council were tabled without identifying the impact
that
would have
on the timetable for reaching consensus, the consequent delay in
the
return of
the inspectors, and the extent to which that would require key
questions
to remain
unresolved.
1112.
The length
of time taken to agree resolution 1441 meant the first
update
from the
inspectors for the Security Council would not be required
until
mid‑February,
and the resolution was silent on what would happen after
that.
1113.
The
potential tension between the time available for inspections and
when
US would be
ready to take military action was recognised in papers produced
by
officials
from July onwards.
1114.
Reporting
from Washington in mid‑October identified clear
indications
that the US
Administration was likely to be impatient about the time
allowed
for inspections.
1115.
Notwithstanding
Mr Blair’s and Mr Straw’s statements at the
time
and his evidence
to the Inquiry, resolution 1441 did not meet all the
UK’s
original objectives.
389