3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
•
The
Directorate of General Intelligence (DGI) had “little reach or
capability outside
Iraq”.
•
There were
indications that Saddam Hussein was “trying to rebuild a
terrorist
capability”,
but the willingness of individuals to conduct attacks was “in
doubt”.
•
There were
suggestions of individuals being trained in Iraq for terrorism in
the
event of a
Coalition attack, including “uncorroborated reports” of suicide
attackers,
but “some
of this reporting may reflect aspiration rather than
reality”.
•
Iraq had the
materials for chemical and biological (CB) terrorism but the
JIC
judged that
the overall terrorist capability was “inadequate to carry out CB
terrorist
attacks
outside Iraq other than individual assassinations using
poisons”.
•
Iraq was
“likely to attempt terrorist attacks against military targets
during a build
up of
Coalition Forces” and it was “possible that attacks – or threats –
could be
directed
against regional states affording support to Coalition
Forces”.
•
Even after
hostilities commenced, the expectation of diplomatic options
might
“restrain
any attempt to use terrorism until he [Saddam Hussein] believes
collapse
of his
regime is certain”.
•
“In the event
of military action”, Saddam Hussein would “seek to conduct
terrorist
attacks”
against the UK’s overseas interests, “especially military forces
and
diplomatic
facilities in the Middle East” and possibly Cyprus; but there was
“no
intelligence”
suggesting specific plans for attacks in the UK. The “experience
of
1991 and
current intelligence” suggested that Iraq might “seek less
well‑protected
targets
overseas, for example South East Asia”.
Al
Qaida
The JIC
judged that “the
greatest terrorist threat in the event of military
action
against Iraq
will come from Al Qaida and other Islamic
extremists”; and they
would be
“pursuing
their own agenda”.
The JIC did
“not believe
that Al Qaida plans to conduct terrorist attacks under
Iraqi
direction”.
The JIC
assessed that “US‑led military action against Iraq” would “motivate
other Islamic
extremist
groups and individuals to carry out terrorist attacks against
Coalition targets”.
Al Qaida
had:
“… sought
to portray anticipated US‑led military operations against Iraq as
further
confirmation
that the US is waging a war on Islam, attracting widespread
popular
support
across the Muslim world and on the Arab ‘street’. Al Qaida could
also use the
opportunity
of a military build up to target Coalition forces in the
Gulf.”
The JIC
predicted that:
“In the
longer term, a Coalition attack may radicalise increasing numbers
of Muslims,
especially
Arabs, and boost support and recruitment for terrorist
groups.”
The JIC
concluded:
“… the
terrorist threat from Al Qaida and other Islamic extremists will
increase in
the event
of US‑led action against Iraq. Widespread, sporadic, opportunity
attacks
are most
likely. Major, complex operations would be mounted by Al Qaida only
if the
timing of
military action coincides with culmination of their longer‑term
attack plans.”
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