The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Dr Hans
Blix was appointed as Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC on 27 January
2000.
A junior
member of the UK permanent Mission to the UN in New York met
Dr Blix on
12 September
2002 for a confidential conversation to explore:
•
how long it
would take UNMOVIC to establish a presence in Iraq;
•
how long it
would take to be “up and running”;
•
how often it
would be realistic for UNMOVIC to report on progress;
and
•
what its
priorities would be for reinforcing inspections.4
The
official reported that the practical arrangements for the return of
inspectors would
be crucial
and would need to be agreed before their deployment. Discussions on
the
arrangements
should take place outside Iraq, but once agreed an advance party
from
UNMOVIC
could be in Iraq in a week. UNMOVIC would prefer to have three
months to
build up
its presence before it “started work as set out in resolution
1284”, but it “could
just about
manage two months”.
The 60 days
to draw up a work programme was “doable if Iraq co‑operated” but
that
deadline
could slip; the report would need to be shown to Iraq and approved
by the
College of
Commissioners. Some inspections could take place within that
period; that
would be an
early test of Iraqi compliance. There was nothing to stop Iraq
providing
UNMOVIC
with the backlog of its biannual declarations on WMD. Depending on
the
co‑operation
it received, UNMOVIC could be “fully operational at the same time
as it
presented
the work programme”.
The
official noted that UNMOVIC already produced quarterly reports and
a report every
month was
likely to be “too frequent”. Regular reports could help to put
pressure on Iraq
and could
be used to highlight non‑co‑operation.
Dr Blix
had received a suggestion that UNMOVIC be asked to report to the
Council
immediately
if Iraq was not co‑operating positively. He did not underestimate
the
difficulties
of annulling the modalities governing access to sensitive sites and
had advised
that the
Security Council could usefully reaffirm existing rights. Asking
UNMOVIC to put
forward
suggestions to strengthen inspections would put its independence in
doubt.
9.
In
preparation for a meeting with Mr Blair and following initial
discussions in
New York,
Mr Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary, set out his thinking on
the UK’s
approach to
the negotiation of a new UN resolution on 14
September.
10.
Mr Straw
advised that the UK’s objective should be a more
intrusive
inspections
regime. If Saddam Hussein complied, that would achieve the
UK’s
WMD
objectives.
11.
Mr Straw
advocated that the UK and the US should seek only one
resolution;
and that it
should incorporate both a demand for the return of inspectors
and
a tougher
inspections regime. That would maximise pressure on Iraq to
comply
and avoid
giving France and Russia a veto over military action.
4
Minute FCO
[junior official] to HMA [UKMIS New York], 12 September 2002,
‘Iraq: Meeting with Blix’.
202