The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
586.
By late
August, the UK was proposing coercion of Iraq to disarm by
means
of a UN
resolution issuing an ultimatum to Iraq to admit the weapons
inspectors.
In the
event that Saddam Hussein refused, or subsequently obstructed,
the
inspectors,
the UK was seeking a commitment from the Security Council
to
take action.
587.
The UK
Government’s first objective was to offer Iraq the opportunity and
a
last chance
to comply with its obligations and avoid military action. In the
event of
Iraq not
taking that opportunity, the UK was also seeking to establish
conditions
whereby
military action (should it become necessary) would command
multilateral
support and
be taken with the authority of the Security Council.
588.
In his
public statements, Mr Blair clearly presented the strategy as
providing
a final
opportunity for Saddam Hussein to disarm peacefully.
589.
Reflecting
the level of public debate and concern, Mr Blair decided in
early
September
that an explanation of why action to deal with Iraq was needed
should
be
published. That led to the publication of the Iraq dossier on 24
September.
He also
considered debate on the issue was sufficiently important for
both
Houses of
Parliament to be recalled from recess.
590.
As a result
of Mr Blair’s initiative and the subsequent bilateral
discussions
involving
Mr Blair, Sir David Manning and Mr Straw, the US
Administration was left
in no doubt
that the UK Government needed the issue of Iraq to be taken back
to
the
Security Council before it would be able to participate in military
action in Iraq.
591.
The UK’s
arguments complemented and reinforced the arguments
being
made within
the US Administration, particularly by Secretary Powell, that the
US
should not
act alone.
592.
The UK was
a key ally whose support was highly desirable for the
US.
593.
That and
the force of UK diplomacy undoubtedly made a
significant
contribution
to President Bush’s decision in the meeting of the National
Security
Council on
7 September to take the issue of Iraq back to the UN.
594.
The
objective of the subsequent discussions between President Bush
and
Mr Blair
at Camp David was, as Mr Blair stated in the press conference
before the
discussions,
to work out the strategy.
595.
Although at
that stage no decision had been taken on which military
package
might be
offered to the US for planning purposes, Mr Blair also told
President
Bush that,
if it came to war, the UK would take a significant military
role.
596.
When
President Bush made his speech on 12 September, the US and UK
had
agreed the
broad approach but not the substance of the proposals to be put to
the
UN Security
Council, nor the tactics.
194