3.4 | Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September 2002

• Saddam “would probably … order preparations for a campaign of terrorism and

sabotage in the region”.

• “… we know that Iraqi Special Forces and other organisations, such as the

‘Saddam Fedayeen’, also possess the capability to conduct sabotage or terrorist

attacks.”

• Palestinian groups “could be reluctant to carry out attacks which did not further

their own objectives”.

• It was “possible that Iraqi terrorist attacks could be conducted against other

[non‑military] interests or the leadership and economic (e.g. oil industry) targets

of regional States”.

• The JIC did not “know enough about Iraqi capabilities to discount the threat

outside the region, including within the UK, though previously Iraqi attempts to

mount terrorist attacks, or engage proxies to do so on their behalf, have been

largely ineffective”.

“Early on in any conflict, Saddam would order missile attacks on Israel, coalition

forces and regional states providing the US with bases.”

• “Saddam would probably order missile attacks …”

• The JIC judged that attacks on Israel would be “an attempt to attract Israeli

retaliation and thus widen the war, split the coalition and arouse popular opinion

in the Arab States”.

• Missiles “could be armed with chemical or biological warfare (CBW) agents”.

• “Saddam might be deterred at least initially by the threat of Israeli nuclear

retaliation.”

• Iraq had a “limited number of long range missiles … available”; the JIC assessed

“12‑20 650km range Al Hussein missiles”.

• Iraq had produced more than 50 Al Samoud missiles with a range of 150km.

• Attacks on coalition forces in Kuwait would require Iraq to deploy short‑range

missiles into the “No Drive Zone”.49

• A pre‑emptive missile attack on Israel was “less likely because it would show

Iraq had been lying about its retention of long range missiles”.

“Saddam would order the use of CBW against coalition forces at some point,

probably after a coalition attack had begun. Once Saddam was convinced that his

fate was sealed, he would order the unrestrained use of CBW against coalition

forces, supporting regional states and Israel.”

• Although it had “little intelligence on Iraq’s CBW doctrine” and knew “little about

Iraq’s CBW work since late 1998”, the JIC judged it “likely that Saddam would

order the use of CBW against coalition forces at some point, probably after

coalition attacks had begun”.

• Iraqi CBW use “would become increasingly likely the closer coalition forces

came to Baghdad. Military targets might include troop concentrations or

important fixed targets in rear areas such as ports and airfields.”

49 Resolution 949 (1994) imposed a “No Drive Zone” in Iraq south of the 32nd parallel.

119