The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Saddam
Hussein was “likely to pursue continued talks with the UN on the
return of
weapons
inspectors as a means to delay a US attack. He would permit their
return if
he believed
that the threat of large‑scale military action was
imminent.”
•
Saddam would
“play for time”, avoiding “giving the US a pretext to
attack”.
•
By mid‑July
2002 Saddam had “started to believe that a US‑led attack
was
inevitable
and would threaten his regime”.
•
An Iraqi
“statement that inspectors would be allowed to return
unconditionally
would
attract considerable international approval” and “reinforce
regional
concerns
about the military option, even before Iraqi willingness to
implement
the
agreement had been put to the test”.
•
The JIC judged
that “until US military action seemed imminent” Iraq would
make
“incremental
improvements” to its “offer on inspectors that fell short of
accepting
the …
requirements of the UN”.
•
If inspectors
did return, the JIC repeated its judgement of 27 February that
Iraq
would
“embark on a renewed policy of frustration, involving denial,
deception,
obstruction
and delay”.
Saddam
Hussein would “try a mix of charm, bribery and threats with
his
neighbours”.
Iraq’s influence was “limited, although Saddam” was “adept
at
manipulating
popular Arab opinion”.
•
Saddam would
seek to deter the US “and/or potential regional allies” and
use
diplomacy
to persuade or coerce his neighbours not to provide
bases.
•
Iraq was
“likely to pursue every opportunity to split the … Security Council
and
particularly
the P5”.
•
It would also
seek to “exert economic leverage”.
•
Iraq could
“play on regional fears” that a military attack “would
have
unacceptable
outcomes” such as threatening Iraq’s integrity, encircling Iran
or
emboldening
the US to attack other countries.
•
Iraq’s ability
to influence neighbouring governments was “strictly
limited”.
•
Saddam was
“likely to try to do all he can to exploit the Israel/Palestinian
crisis”.
The JIC
pointed out that, “Practical support to Palestinian rejectionists
groups”
was
“limited”; and there was “little scope for Iraq to improve its
position” as the
most
effective groups were “closer to Iran”.
•
Saddam was
“adept at manipulating popular Arab opinion”.
“Much as
Saddam would like to seize the initiative before a US attack, his
options
remain
limited.” He was “likely to be cautious about using force early.
But the
closer and
more credible an attack seemed, the more risks he will be willing
to take,
perhaps
including deniable terrorist attacks, most likely in the Gulf
region – though
we cannot
exclude a threat to the UK.”
•
A “concerted
attempt” to bring down an aircraft in one of the No‑Fly Zones
was
“a possibility”.
•
A pre‑emptive
attack on the Kurds or Kuwait was judged “unlikely”.
•
An attempt to
destabilise the two main Kurdish parties “to complicate
coalition
planning”
was “more likely”.
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