The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
526.
Mr Blair
continued to offer the US support for its goal of regime change
in
Iraq but
was concerned about the impact of unilateral US military action on
the
UK’s
strategic interests across a wide range of issues.
527.
Mr Blair’s
meeting with Ministerial colleagues on 23 July was not seen
by
those
involved as having taken decisions.
528.
Further
advice and background material was commissioned, including
on
the
possibility of a UN ultimatum to Iraq and the legal basis for
action, on the
assumption
that the UK would take part in any military action.
529.
Mr Blair
was advised that there would be “formidable obstacles” to
securing
a new UN
resolution incorporating an ultimatum without convincing evidence
of
a greatly
increased threat from Iraq. A great deal more work would be needed
to
clarify
what the UK was seeking and how that objective might best be
achieved.
530.
Mr Blair’s
Note to President Bush of 28 July sought to persuade
President
Bush to use
the UN to build a coalition for action by seeking a partnership
with
the US and
setting out a framework for action.
531.
Mr Blair
told President Bush that the UN was the simplest way to
encapsulate
a “casus
belli” in some defining way, with an ultimatum to Iraq once
military
forces
started to build up in October. That might be backed by a UN
resolution.
532.
Mr Blair
thought it unlikely that Saddam Hussein intended to
allow
inspectors
to return. If he did, the JIC had advised that Iraq would obstruct
the
work of the
inspectors. That could result in a material breach of the
obligations
imposed by
the UN.
533.
The Note
reflected Mr Blair’s own views. The proposals had not
been
discussed
or agreed with his colleagues.
534.
Sir David
Manning told President Bush that Mr Blair agreed Saddam
Hussein
had to go,
but it would be impossible for the UK to take part in any action
against
Iraq unless
it went through the UN.
535.
Mr Blair’s
initiative had the effect of setting the UK on a path leading
to
diplomatic
activity in the UN and the possibility of participation in military
action
in a way
that would make it very difficult for the UK subsequently to
withdraw its
support for
the US.
90