The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
of
terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed
around
the policy.
The NSC had no patience with the UN route and no enthusiasm
for
publishing
material on the Iraqi regime’s record.”
•
Adm Boyce
reported that Secretary Rumsfeld and President Bush would
be
briefed by
CENTCOM planners in early August. The US was examining
two
military
options, and saw the “UK (and Kuwait) as essential”. The three
main
options for
UK involvement were:
“(i) Basing
in Diego Garcia and Cyprus plus […] SF squadrons.
(ii) As
above, with maritime and air assets in addition.
(iii) As
above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000 perhaps with a
discrete
role in
northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi
divisions.”
•
Mr Hoon
said that the US had already begun “spikes of activity” to put
pressure
on the
regime. In his view, January was the most likely timing for
military action.
•
Mr Straw
stated that it “seemed clear” that President Bush had “made up
his
mind to
take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But
the case
was thin.
Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD
capability
was less
than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran.” The UK “should work up a
plan
for an
ultimatum to Saddam” to allow the UN weapons inspectors back in to
Iraq.
That would
“help with the legal justification for the use of
force”.
•
Lord
Goldsmith warned that the desire for regime change was not a legal
basis
for
military action. Self-defence and humanitarian intervention could
not be the
basis for
military action in this case. Relying on resolution 1205 (1998) for
UN
authorisation
“would be difficult”. The situation “might of course
change”.
•
Mr Blair
stated: “it would make a big difference politically and legally if
Saddam
refused to
allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were
linked
in the
sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There
were
different
strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political
context were
right,
people would support regime change.”
•
Mr Blair
added: “The two key issues were whether the military plan worked
and
whether we
had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to
work.”
•
Adm Boyce
did not yet know if the US battleplan was “workable”. There
were
“lots of
questions”, for example “the consequences if Saddam Hussein
used
WMD on day
one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting
began”.
•
Mr Straw
“thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan
unless
convinced
it was the winning strategy”, but there “could be US/UK
differences”
on the
political strategy. The ultimatum should be “discreetly” explored,
despite
US
resistance. Saddam Hussein would “continue to play hard-ball with
the UN”.
•
Mr Scarlett
assessed that “Saddam would allow the inspectors back in
only
when he
thought the threat of military action was real”.
•
Mr Hoon
stated that, if Mr Blair wanted UK military involvement, an
early
decision
would be required. Mr Hoon cautioned that “many in the US did
not
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