The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Addressing
the longer term, the JIC stated:
“… given
real progress on Israel/Palestine, it might be possible to rebuild
support for
action
against Iraq …”
“…
Saudi
Arabia … has said
it opposes an attack … Turkey, as
a NATO ally, would
probably
provide basing if asked, despite its reservations
[…].”
Regional
attitudes to an attack would “remain tentative” until US plans were
“closer to
completion
and military preparations begin”, but “a number of themes” were
“already
discernible”.
These included:
•
“[G]overnments
in the region would want any military campaign to be short
and
decisive.”
•
“[M]utual
suspicions among Iraq’s neighbours” meant
regional co-operation
was “likely
to be minimal.”
•
Iran wanted “a
greater role for the Iraqi Shia in a new regime, but any
pro-Iran
Shia
regime, though unlikely would be anathema to the Gulf Arabs”. Iran
and
Turkey were
“keen not to set a precedent for their own Kurdish regions,
[…]
A power
vacuum could cause particular problems and might tempt Iran
and/or
Turkey to
intervene.”
•
Gulf
Monarchies might be “willing to support a representational
Government, but
would
equate democracy with Shia rule”.
•
Iran’s “sense
of encirclement would be heightened by the presence of US
forces,
particularly
if they remained in Iraq for an extended period”.
In a
concluding section entitled “Making the
case”, the JIC
assessed:
“For
governments expected to support a US-led attack, the justification
and
evidence will
be crucial in managing their public expectation. Given
that we
judge Iraq
had no responsibility for … the 11 September terrorist attacks,
Iraq’s
neighbours
are likely to demand stronger proof of Iraq’s development of WMD
…
using
Saddam’s brutal and repressive regime alone as a justification
would not attract
much
support. A UN Security Council resolution authorising force would
reduce
regional
governments’ objections to an attack. Partly
because their populations
will not be
persuaded by any likely justification for a military option,
Iraq’s
neighbours,
except for perhaps Kuwait, would prefer UN inspections to
a
US‑led
attack. […] Equally,
it is possible that by offering to allow inspectors back
into
Iraq (even
if he obstructed them) and making some new but limited concessions
to
the
disarmament process, Saddam could strengthen his regional political
position,
at least in
the short term.”
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