3.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 –
“axis of evil” to Crawford
742.
Iraq needed
to disarm or be disarmed in accordance with the
obligations
imposed by
the UN; and that it was important to agree to the return of
UN
inspectors
to Iraq.
743.
The focus
on Iraq was not the result of a step change in Iraq’s
capabilities
or intentions.
744.
Although
the possibility of future military action provided the context
for
the
discussion at Cabinet on 7 March, Mr Blair and Mr Straw emphasised
that
no decisions
had been taken and Cabinet was not being asked to take
decisions.
745.
The
discussion was couched in terms of Iraq’s need to comply with
its
obligations
and future choices by the international community on how to
respond
to the
threat which Iraq represented.
746.
Cabinet
endorsed the conclusion that Iraq’s WMD programmes posed
a
threat to
peace and a strategy of engaging closely with the US Government
in
order to
shape policy and its presentation. But it did not discuss how that
might
be
achieved.
747.
Mr Blair
sought and was given information on a range of issues before
his
meeting
with President Bush. But no formal and agreed analysis of the
issues and
options was
sought or produced; and there was no collective consideration
of
such
advice.
748.
The advice
offered to Mr Blair by Mr Straw, Mr Hoon and Mr Powell
assumed
that the US
objective would be regime change and that the UK would be likely
to
support
US-led military action in some circumstances if that could be shown
to be
necessary
to eliminate Iraq’s WMD.
749.
At
Crawford, Mr Blair offered President Bush a partnership in
dealing
urgently
with the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. He proposed a strategy
based
on an
ultimatum calling on Iraq to permit the return of weapons
inspectors or face
the
consequences.
750.
Mr Blair’s
approach reflected the thinking in Mr Straw’s advice of 25
March.
Proposing
that the US and UK should seek an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein
to
readmit
weapons inspectors provided a route for the UK to align itself with
the US
without
adopting the US objective of regime change.
751.
President
Bush agreed to consider the idea but there was no decision
until
September
2002.
752.
It was
subsequently reported that, in his discussions with President
Bush,
Mr Blair
set out a number of considerations in relation to the development
of
policy on
Iraq, which were subsequently described by others as
“conditions”
for action
(see Section 3.3).
525