3.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 –
“axis of evil” to Crawford
•
“Military
action requires key allies, particularly in the region, to be on
board.
That is why
we see continuing with the UN route – i.e. ratcheting up pressure
on
Iraq to
comply with UN resolutions and allow weapons inspectors back in as
a
necessary
precursor. We doubt Saddam will co-operate but we must be seen
to
have
tried.”
•
“Also
essential to alert sceptical world to the WMD threat … We are
working on
evidence
paper.”
•
“Meanwhile
… should continue our efforts to get GRL implemented – will
remind
international
community that our quarrel is not with the Iraqi
people.”
•
“…
Introduction of revised sanctions regime will send an important
signal of
Security
Council unanimity. Thereafter focus will be on clarification of
UNSCR
1284. We
should use this to put pressure on Saddam to readmit
inspections.”
•
“Consistent
message we are getting from region and beyond is that if it
is
decided to
launch military action, that action must succeed in removing
Saddam,
otherwise
we will be worse off than we are now.”
•
“Issues
arising from regime change on which I would welcome your
thoughts:
{{Assessment of
Iraqi Opposition …
{{Require
serious movement on MEPP to give us space in which to
act;
{{Day
after issues loom large. Territorial integrity of Iraq important.
Likely
replacement
for Saddam – another Sunni strongman. Establishing
representative
Government would require long term commitment;
{{Genuine
consultation and construction of convincing legal basis will
be
353.
Mr Blair
told Vice President Cheney on 11 March that it was “highly
desirable
to get rid
of Saddam”, and that the “UK would help” the US “as long as there
was
a clever
strategy”.
354.
That meant
building up the case against Saddam carefully and
intelligently;
putting him
in the wrong place over inspections and compliance with UN
Security
Council
resolutions; and thereby helping to convince “international opinion
to
rally to
the idea of regime change” and avoiding unintended
consequences.
355.
Mr Blair’s
approach reflected a deliberate choice that the right way
to
get close
to the US in order to influence it was to offer the UK’s support
for its
objectives.
356.
In his
public statement after the meeting, Mr Blair emphasised that
no
decisions
had been taken.
130
Note FCO,
‘Visit of US Vice President Dick Cheney 11 March: Iraq’, attached
to Letter McDonald to
Rycroft, 8
March 2002, ‘US Vice President’s Call on the Prime Minister, 11
March’.
449