The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
On the role
of the Ba’ath Party, the Red Team stated:
“To be a
Ba’athist does not necessarily mean an individual is a hard core
supporter of
the regime.
Most joined to advance their careers or under duress (mostly
government
employees).
In every government department there is a hard-core …
“It will
require detailed inside knowledge to identify the ‘bad apples’ in
any
organisation;
it may not necessarily be the head of the organisation, it could
be
the number
two or three, or someone even further down the hierarchy.
Outsiders,
particularly
Westerners – who lack detailed knowledge of pre-war political
agendas
which are
unconnected with the Saddam regime – may need to exercise caution
to
ensure they
do not become unwitting agents in any infighting in any existing
Iraqi
organisations
that are kept in place.”
The Red
Team concluded:
“Historically
there is trouble in Iraq whenever central authority is weakened. It
may
therefore
be advisable to maintain a Coalition military government longer
than
currently
envisaged …”
On 11
April, in a report on the future governance of Iraq, the Red Team
listed five steps for
the
successful establishment of a long-term representative Iraqi
government:
“•
Establishing a
peaceful and secure environment.
•
Answering
immediate humanitarian needs.
•
Establishing
an effective Interim Administration.
•
Re-establishing
the rule of law …
•
A
constitutional process leading to elections and the withdrawal of
Coalition
The Red
Team concluded that the Coalition would have to make use of
indigenous Iraqi
security
forces to establish and maintain law and order. The Iraqi Army was
described
as the
“most trusted and least corrupt national security institution”. It
was “Iraq’s oldest
institution
and a focus of national pride. Some senior officers and units have
remained
sufficiently
detached from the regime to be of use.” The Iraqi Army could not be
used
everywhere.
In the south-east “the Marsh Arabs have cause to hate them”, but
they
would be
respected and preferred to Coalition Forces in many areas. In
contrast, the civil
police were
“a largely discredited and demoralised force … viewed as
auxiliaries to the
Ba’athist
security apparatus”. However, the Red Team assessed that, in the
short term,
it might be
worth “making use of them with appropriate direction and
supervision from
Coalition
forces”.
In its
final report, ‘The Strands of the Rope’, issued on 18 April, the
Red Team emphasised
the
immediate need to re-institute the rule of law in Iraq, using
ex-Ba’ath personnel
(“accompanied
by a well-publicised and effective screening process that will
remove
128
Minute
PS/CDI to APS2/SoS [MOD], 11 April 2003, ‘Iraq Red Team – the
Future Governance of Iraq’
attaching
Paper DIS Red Team, [undated], ‘Iraq Red Team: the Future
Governance of Iraq’.
42