1.2 | Development of UK strategy and options, September 2000 to September 2001

The Inquiry asked Sir William Patey why it appeared that the countries neighbouring Iraq

were becoming less concerned about the threat from Iraq and more willing to allow trade

to carry on in contravention of the sanctions regime.8 Sir William told the Inquiry that

those countries’ attitudes to Iraq varied:

“… the concern was greater in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia than it was in Syria and

Turkey, and Jordan had a rather special relationship with Iraq, a dependency

relationship, it was very worried about its economy and being cut off. So there were

a complex set of relationships.

“I think I would describe the region as, if they had had faith in the policy, they would

have supported it more, but if it was going to fail, they didn’t want to be on the wrong

side of Saddam … I would say they were hedging their bets … not that … they were

unaware of the threat.”

Sir William also told the Inquiry that the complexity of the sanctions regime itself,

including the Oil-for-Food (OFF) programme, meant that Iraq was able to evade the

controls.9

While sanctions on civilian trade were eroding, the UK assessed that the arms embargo

on Iraq remained broadly effective.

Mr Simon Webb, MOD Director General Operational Policy from July 1999 to September

2001, told the Inquiry:

“… The general impression we had … by the start of 2001 was that the arms

embargo was, in general, holding up well … almost all members of the United

Nations were abiding by it, which was preventing the Iraqis from acquiring major

new weapons systems … but there was some leakage still of parts and components

which allowed them [the Iraqi military] to be a bit more effective.”10

Mr Carne Ross, First Secretary responsible for the Middle East at the UK Permanent

Mission to the United Nations in New York (UKMIS New York) from 1997 to 2002, told

the Inquiry:

“While there were serious sanctions breaches, it was not the UK judgement that

these permitted significant rearmament, which was our major concern.”11

8 Public hearing, 24 November 2009, pages 42-43.

9 Public hearing, 24 November 2009, page 160.

10 Public hearing, 24 November 2009, page 19.

11 Statement, 12 July 2010, page 2.

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