12.2 |
Conclusions: Security Sector Reform
The focus
was therefore on getting UK officers into niche roles in which they
could
use their
experience without being operational. As any officers deployed
would have
to be
volunteers, certain security conditions also had to be met and
funding identified.
Government
officials do not appear to have appreciated the scope of that task
before they
started
recruiting officers for Iraq.
The UK’s
target was to have deployed 100 UK officers to conduct basic
training by the
end of
September 2003.
On 18 July,
Mr Straw wrote to Mr David Blunkett, the Home Secretary,
asking him to seek
nominations
of up to 200 officers for firearms training. By September, 260 had
applied but
none had
been deployed.
It is
unclear whether that was because of a reluctance on the part of the
Association of
Chief
Police Officers (ACPO) and Chief Constables (concerned about
breaching their duty
of care
given the security situation in Iraq) to release officers or
whether it was because
the
officers who had applied were not suitably qualified.
In addition
to the officers required to run basic training, DCC Brand had also
requested
support
staff and officers to address more specific training needs such as
intelligence and
operational
planning. He told the Inquiry how, after lobbying for a Special
Branch system,
he was
unable to find someone to make the concept a reality and
consequently lost
the opportunity.
An email
from DCC Brand on 21 September expressed frustration that officers
had still
not been
deployed to a Joint Command Centre in Baghdad designed to prevent
friendly
fire
incidents:
“ … I don’t
mind where they come from as long as they get here ASAP … I made
my
original
request … 6 weeks
ago … If we are
only just thinking about approaching
PSNI
[Police Service of Northern Ireland] it may be weeks or months
before
the
officers are able to travel and we would lose all credibility with
the American
military …
To remind you, this was
our idea … I urge
you to act swiftly and not
The FCO,
and in particular UND, had prior experience of deploying officers
overseas but
was unable
to meet the large‑scale requirements of Iraq. Sir Michael Jay
should have
ensured
that his department provided the resources that the senior UK
officers needed.
In
November, after meeting DCC White, Mr Bill Rammell, FCO
Parliamentary
Under‑Secretary
of State, reported that DCC White’s assessment of progress was at
odds
with the
way the situation was being described in public.
The Home
Office record of the Iraq Senior Officials Group of 4 November
recorded that
Mr Straw’s
initial reaction to DCC White’s complaints was to call a “special
meeting of
Ministers
to discuss what more could be done”19
but that
FCO officials had advised that
that was
not necessary.
Following a
visit in November, Mr Straw directed Mr John Sawers, FCO
Director General
Political,
to resolve the matter: “A combination of the Byzantine bureaucracy
of ACPO and
a lack of
understanding in the FCO about police issues and practice …
threaten further
18
Email Brand
to FCO [junior official], 21 September 2003, ‘Re: Police Training
plan’.
19
Minute
Storr to Acton, 5 November 2003, ‘Iraq: Senior Officials Meeting on
4 November’.
421