The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
emergencies.1028
The planned
number of officers was 25,000 but it was currently
staffed
to “around
19,000”. Almost all National Police personnel were deployed in
Baghdad.
Mr Asquith
reported that the National Police’s first major deployment in June
had been
“disappointing”
and the second “somewhat better” but capability concerns remained.
In
response,
MNF‑I and the MOI had initiated a comprehensive retraining and
leadership
programme,
resulting in a reshuffle that attracted local and international
press coverage.
It was now
in the second phase of retraining which was scheduled to run until
September
2007.
Officers would be retrained in police (as opposed to military)
skills and “not released
for duties
until they are able to meet the required standard”.
The MNF‑I
hoped that the retraining would also make “the NP [National Police]
less
susceptible
to the influence and infiltration of the militias” but
Mr Asquith noted: “Indeed,
as so often
with the ISF as a whole, leadership will be the key.”
While the
National Police’s future role was undecided, the aim was to turn it
into a “more
aggressive,
responsive, paramilitary‑style force over the next five years”,
similar to
the Italian
Carabinieri (National Military Police). Plans for regionalising the
force were
dependent
on the security situation in Baghdad, where the National Police
would be
crucial in
maintaining public order once the US drawdown began.
A JIC
Assessment issued on 9 June 2006 reported:
“The more
capable National Police, largely confined to the Baghdad region,
have
provided
effective support to MNF counter‑insurgency operations. But we
judge that
there are
serious problems of corruption, criminality, and divided loyalties;
elements
have taken
part in sectarian attacks and are prone to Shia militia
influence.”1029
A Report to
Congress on 30 November 2006 stated that while the National Police
had
“proven
useful in fighting the insurgency”, frequent allegations of abuse
and other illegal
activities
affected their credibility.1030
A report in
June 2007 stated that a four‑phase
transformation
programme began in October 2006 to reorient the National Police
towards
police (as
opposed to paramilitary) functions:
•
Phase I:
“Quicklook” inspections to improve overall readiness.
•
Phase II:
Standardised collective training, including added emphasis on
human
rights,
Rule of Law and police ethics. Extensive re‑vetting of currently
serving
officers,
including ID checks, fingerprints, biometrics, a literacy test, and
criminal
intelligence
background checks. There was no specific screening for
militia
affiliation.
•
Phase III: An
Italian led training plan based on the tactics, techniques
and
procedures
of the Carabinieri.
•
Phase IV:
Forward positioning to train on contingencies such as security
for
pilgrimages,
natural disasters and national emergencies.1031
1028
eGram
54506/06 Baghdad to FCO, 7 December 2006, ‘Iraq: The National
Police’.
1029
JIC
Assessment, 9 June 2006, ‘The Iraqi Security Forces: Fit for
Duty?’
1030
Report to
Congress, 30 November 2006, Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq.
1031
Report to
Congress, 7 June 2007, Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq.
312