12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
CC
Kernaghan visited Iraq from 12 to 17 May 2005 and wrote a report of
his findings
on 25 May
to Mr Charles Clarke, the Home Secretary, and Mr Chris
Fox, President of
ACPO.758
The first
part of this visit was spent investigating the role of UK police
officers
with
Sir Ronnie Flanagan, HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary, CC
Hugh Orde, Chief
Constable
of PSNI, and Mr Colin Cramphorn, Chief Constable of West
Yorkshire.
In his
report, CC Kernaghan endorsed the use of armoured vehicles within
military
convoys for
police officer secondees, but considered enhanced weaponry “a step
too far”.
He
cautioned against treating police officers who had served in
Northern Ireland differently
from those
without this background, noting that this “could be interpreted as
… placing a
lesser
value on their safety and treating them as de facto cannon
fodder”.
On 24
October, Major General James Dutton, GOC MND(SE) from June 2005
until
December
2005, wrote that “clarity” in the contractual obligations of UK
police officers and
ArmorGroup
personnel was needed.759
In
addition:
“…we will
need to resolve the issue of movement restrictions on the CivPol
and
ArmorGroup
personnel. There appear to be different transport restrictions
placed
upon civil
servants employed by MOD to those working for the FCO and
their
contractors,
CivPol and ArmorGroup (although there are even differences
between
them). The
principal problem is that the FCO and their contractors are not
permitted
to travel
in military vehicles.”
On 11
November, CC Kernaghan emailed a junior official in the Home Office
following a
report from
DCC Smith that stated Maj Gen Dutton wished to assume
control of police and
ArmorGroup
assets, and see police personnel travel in Snatch
vehicles.760
Maj Gen Dutton
had
reportedly suggested he would review the relevant contracts of
employment to enable
the
latter.
CC
Kernaghan wrote that it was important that the arrangements for
police officers were
not
considered in isolation from those of other deployed civilians and
emphasised his
expectation
that he should be consulted on any move to change the command and
control
arrangements
for deployed police officers, not presented with a “fait
accompli”.
Acting
Commander Kevin Hurley, Chief Police Adviser in Basra, June 2004 to
December
2004, told
the Inquiry of the challenges of trying to effect police training
and mentoring
while being
unable to travel:
“Security
conditions made road travel almost impossible … We were all
but
ineffective
for most of our time. Ultimately … we reached a stage whereby if we
could
not get a
helicopter ride we did not move.”761
In his
evidence to the Inquiry, Lieutenant General Jonathan Riley,
GOC MND(SE) from
November
2004 to June 2005, said that the “chief difficulty” of the FCO
rather than the
military
leading police work was the restrictions placed on civilian
personnel meant that he
758
Report
Kernaghan to Clarke and Fox, 25 May 2005, ‘Report on
4th
Visit to
Iraq by Chief Constable
Kernaghan –
12/16 May 2005’.
759
Letter
Dutton to Wall, 24 October 2005, ‘Policing SE Iraq’.
760
Email
Kernaghan to Home Office [junior official], 11 November 2005, ‘UK
civil police assistance effort in
Iraq –
command & control issues – request for clarity’.
761
Statement,
17 June 2010, page 3.
239