9.2 | 23
May 2003 to June 2004
The JIC
assessed in early September that:
“In most
cases, we do not know who carried out specific attacks. The
intelligence
picture is
incomplete. But intelligence indicates several categories of groups
are
responsible:
–
supporters and officials of the former Iraqi regime;
–
‘Mujahedin’ (mainly foreign fighters, but also Iraqi Sunni
extremists);
– Sunni
Islamic terrorist organisations, mainly Ansar
al-Islam;
–
unaffiliated Iraqis, motivated by personal, local or tribal
grievances or by
payment
from one of the groups listed above.”171
The JIC
also judged that:
“The
security environment will remain poor, and will probably worsen
over the next
year,
unless the Coalition, in conjunction with Iraqis, can reverse
current trends.
There are
likely to be more spectacular attacks.”
Tension in
central Iraq increased after the bombing.172
By 29
August, the World Bank and IMF missions had been withdrawn, a
number of
NGOs were
withdrawing their international staff, and the UN had withdrawn
some staff
temporarily
while reviewing its options.173
Lieutenant
General Freddie Viggers told the Inquiry that the attack on the UN
was:
“… a huge
blow … they knew precisely where to put that truck … Of course it
shook
up the
workers of the UN right across the country, and the threats kept
coming, and it
was of no
surprise that within a few days they said ‘We can’t sustain
this’.”174
On 29
August, Sir Nigel Sheinwald, Mr Blair’s Foreign Policy
Adviser, suggested to
Mr Blair
that a ‘next step’ for the UK should be to:
“… persuade
the UN to adopt a realistic approach to security. Give more
security
advice and
equipment to UNAMI [United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq] so
that it
can
continue with as many operations as possible in the greater threat
environment.
Where the
UN operates, other international bodies and NGOs will
follow.”175
Mr Bearpark
told the Inquiry:
“It is very
difficult to overstate the chaos that [the UN bombing] caused for
the CPA,
because all
your interlocutors suddenly vanished and you didn’t even know
where
171
JIC
Assessment, 3 September 2003, ‘Iraq: Threats to
Security’.
172
Briefing
Cabinet Office, 20 August 2003, ‘Iraq: Update for Ministers, 21
August 2003’.
173
Minute
Sheinwald to Prime Minister, 29 August 2003, ‘Iraq’ attaching Note
Cabinet Office, ‘Iraq: Update
29 August
2003’.
174
Public
hearing, 9 December 2009, page 57.
175
Minute
Sheinwald to Prime Minister, 29 August 2003, ‘Iraq’
attaching
Note Cabinet Office, ‘Iraq: Update
29 August
2003’.
176
Public
hearing, 6 July 2010, page 29.
257