The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1433.
On that
basis, the UK planned to reduce its military contribution in Iraq
to
medium
scale within four months of the start of the
invasion636
and
expected not
to have to
make a substantial commitment to post-conflict
administration.637
1434.
Achieving
that outcome depended on the UK’s ability to persuade the
US
of the
merits of a significant post-conflict role for the UN.
1435.
The UK
could not be certain at any stage in the year before the invasion
that
it would
succeed in that aim.
1436.
In January
2003, the UK sought to persuade the US of the benefits of
UN
leadership
of Iraq’s interim post-conflict civil
administration.638
Officials
warned
that, if
the UK failed to persuade the US, it risked “being drawn into a
huge
commitment
of UK resources for a highly complex task of administration
and
law and
order for an uncertain period”.
1437.
By March
2003, having failed to persuade the US of the
advantages
of a UN‑led
interim administration, the UK had set the less ambitious
goal
of
persuading the US to accept UN authorisation of a Coalition-led
interim
administration
and an international presence that would include the
UN.639
1438.
On 19
March, Mr Blair stated in Parliament that discussions were
taking
place with
the US, UN and others on the role of the UN and post-conflict
issues.640
1439.
Discussions
continued, but, as the invasion began:
•
The UK had
not secured US agreement to a Security Council
resolution
authorising
post-conflict administration and could not be sure when, or
on
what terms,
agreement would be possible.
•
The extent
of the UN’s preparations, which had been hindered by
the
absence of
agreement on post-conflict arrangements, remained
uncertain.
Mr Annan
emphasised to Ms Short the need for clarity on US thinking
so
that UN
planning could proceed641
and told
Sir Jeremy Greenstock that
he “would
not wish to see any arrangement subjugating UN activity
to
636
Minute CDS
to CJO, 18 March 2003, ‘Op TELIC: Authorisation for Military
Operations in Iraq’ attaching
Paper CDS,
‘Chief of Defence Staff Execute Directive to the Joint Commander
for Operation TELIC
(Phases 3
and 4)’.
637
Minute
Straw and Hoon to Prime Minister, 19 March 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Military
Contribution to
post‑conflict Iraq’.
638
Minute
Ricketts to Private Secretary [FCO], 7 February 2003, ‘Iraq
Strategy’.
639
Paper Iraq
Planning Unit, 25 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Phase IV: Authorising
UNSCR’.
640
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 19 March
2003, columns 931-932.
641
Telegram
501 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 21 March 2003, ‘Iraq
Humanitarian/Reconstruction:
Clare
Short’s Visit to New York’.
642
Telegram
526 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 25 March 2003, ‘Iraq Phase IV: UN
Dynamics’.
562