6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
and OFF.
“This would require a further resolution. It should be achievable
if the
Security
Council is satisfied with the extent of UN involvement in the
transition …
Even
Rumsfeld is beginning to accept the need for it. On current plans
it would
not be
presented until the end of the conflict.”
•
UN
administration. This would make sense for “international
acceptability and for
the skills,
which the UN could bring … But the US is set against, because
they
believe the
UN has performed poorly elsewhere. We are therefore
proposing
that the
UN’s expertise should be used in technical areas such as education
and
health. A
UN Special Representative … will be required to pull the UN
machinery
together
locally … We have given the US proposals for UN
involvement.
Mr Hoon
pursued with Rumsfeld, and you will want to follow up with Condi
Rice.”
•
The
political process. “We need urgently to pin down a process so that
it can be
announced
as soon as a decision is taken to remove Saddam by force …
Again
we have
given the US outline proposals, but should firm them
up.”
•
Humanitarian
issues. “Although the US has good plans to bring in
humanitarian
relief
behind the military it has not thought through how to encourage
NGOs and
UN
specialised agencies to engage. The international community also
needs a
contingency
financing plan …”
•
The
economy. A joint working group with the US was working on a plan
for
transparent
management of Iraq’s oil revenues, which needed “a political push
in
the
US”.
•
Reconstruction
contracts. The US needed to be encouraged to create “a
level
playing
field”.
•
Security.
The Pentagon wanted to withdraw units from Iraq as quickly
as
possible.
“We must prevent the UK bearing a disproportionate share of
the
security
burden at a time when military overstretch is causing problems
with
meeting our
other priorities. If we are not to replicate the problems seen
in
Afghanistan,
we will also need the US to agree early on to [a] single holistic
plan
for
Security Sector Reform. We have offered outline proposals for the
security
sector. We
should offer a plan.”
•
Justice.
The US had asked the UK to lead on the revival of the Iraqi
justice
system.
•
Sectorisation.
The UK needed “urgently to understand the recent US
suggestion
that Iraq
be divided into three geographical sectors and that we should run
one
of them (a
much bigger area than the Basra Area of Operations) with
enormous
personnel
and financial implications”.
•
The
timeframe. “US plans are very ambitious. The reforms planned
are
unlikely to
be achieved within a two year period. We are likely to need
longer
engagement
in Iraq if we are to leave a durable legacy, but we should deliver
the
latter
stages under an Iraqi administration. The US will need to be
persuaded of
this
fact.”
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