The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Developments
during August 2002.........................................................................
249
JIC
Assessment, 21 August 2002: ‘Saddam’s Diplomatic and
Military
Options’.............................................................................................................
255
The impact
of Operation FRESCO...................................................................
257
PJHQ
advice, 30 August 2002..........................................................................
259
Preparations
for Mr Blair’s meeting with President Bush, Camp
David..................
261
SPG paper,
4 September 2002.........................................................................
262
MOD advice,
6 September 2002......................................................................
264
The outcome
of the meeting at Camp David...........................................................
268
JIC
Assessment, 9 September 2002 ......................................................................
270
Decisions
to offer ground forces to the US for planning
purposes................................
271
MOD
planning for a UK land contribution, September 2002...................................
271
Cabinet, 23
September 2002............................................................................
280
Chiefs of
Staff meeting, 25 September 2002 ...................................................
281
SPG paper,
30 September 2002.......................................................................
283
The MOD
request to offer ground forces ...............................................................
286
Mr Hoon’s
minute, 15 October 2002.................................................................
294
No.10’s
questions ............................................................................................
297
The FCO
perspective........................................................................................
299
Mr Blair’s
meeting, 17 October 2002.......................................................................
300
Mr Blair’s
decision to offer Package 3 to the US, 31 October
2003........................
302
Cabinet, 24
October 2002.................................................................................
303
MOD
concerns about the US perspective........................................................
304
JIC
Assessment, 30 October 2002: ‘Turkey: Attitude to an Iraq
Campaign’.....
309
Mr Blair’s
meeting, 31 October 2002................................................................
310
Why did the
UK Government decide to offer ground forces? .......................................
311
Why did the
UK offer a divisional headquarters and an armoured brigade?
..........
312
What was
the UK’s desire to influence the US seeking to achieve, and was
it
a
determining factor in the decision?......................................................................
314
What
factors influenced the timing of the decision?................................................
318
Were the
post‑conflict implications for the UK, of a significant role on
the
ground in
an invasion of Iraq, properly addressed?................................................
319
Did the
need to maintain the Army’s morale influence the
decision?......................
320
Were the
other risks of offering ground forces fully identified and
considered?......
323
UK pursuit
of the northern option..................................................................................
324
Discussions
with the US about Turkey’s position....................................................
324
172