The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
community
could not “have confidence that past programmes or any
remaining
part of
them have been terminated”. An “effective presence of
international
inspectors”
would, however, “serve as a deterrent against efforts aimed
at
reactivating
or developing new programmes”.
•
Iraq had
“made considerable efforts to provide explanations, to begin
inquiries
and to
undertake exploration and excavations” during the month and a
half
before
UNMOVIC’s withdrawal.
•
“… [T]hose
efforts did not bring the answers needed … We did not
have
time to
interview the large number of persons who were said by Iraq to
have
participated
in the unilateral destruction of biological and chemical
weapons
in 1991.
Such interviews might have helped towards the resolution of
some
outstanding
issues, although one must be aware that the totalitarian regime
in
Iraq
continued to cast a shadow on the credibility of all
interviews.”
•
The
programme to destroy the Al Samoud 2 missiles had not been
completed,
and “there
was no time to assess whether the Al Fatah missile stayed within
the
range
allowed”.
•
The report
showed that the weapons destroyed before the inspectors left in
1998
“were, in
almost all cases declared by Iraq, and that the destruction
occurred
before 1993
in the case of missiles, and before 1994 in the case of
chemical
weapons”.
•
The
existence and scope of the biological weapons programme was
uncovered
by UNSCOM
in 1995, “despite Iraq’s denials and concealment efforts”; “only
a
few
remnants” of the programme were subsequently found. “A great deal –
Iraq
asserts all
– was unilaterally destroyed in 1991.”
•
The lack of
significant finds over many years “could be because the
items
were
unilaterally destroyed by the Iraqi authorities or else they were
effectively
concealed
by them”. In the “new environment in which there is full
access
and
co-operation, and in which knowledgeable witnesses should no longer
be
inhibited
from revealing what they know, it should be possible to establish
the
truth”.
•
The
inspectors had looked for sites where mobile facilities could be
operated
and Iraq
had presented some information about the mobile systems
they
possessed
which did not match “the description which has recently been
made
available
to us, as well as the media, by the United States”. UNMOVIC could
not
“make a
proper evaluation of the depicted vehicles on the basis of the
published
material
alone”.
•
UNMOVIC
remained “ready to resume work in Iraq as an independent verifier
or
to conduct
long-term monitoring, should the Council so decide”.
482