The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
417.
While
recognising the difficulties, the UK continued actively to pursue
the
policy
framework agreed earlier in 2001 of strengthening the policy of
containing
Iraq,
through a revised and more targeted sanctions regime and seeking
Iraq’s
agreement
to the return of inspectors as required by resolution 1284
(1999).
418.
The
adoption of resolution 1382 (2001) went some way towards
that
objective.
But support for economic sanctions was eroding and whether
Iraq
would ever
agree to re-admit weapons inspectors and allow them to
operate
without
obstruction was in doubt.
419.
Following
President Bush’s remarks on 26 November, there were
renewed
UK concerns
that US attention was turning towards military action on
Iraq.
420.
Mr Blair’s
discussion with President Bush on 3 December and the paper
he
sent to
President Bush the following day represented a significant
development
of the UK’s
approach. Mr Blair suggested a “clever strategy” for regime
change
in Iraq
that built over time, until the point was reached where “military
action
could be
taken if necessary”, without losing international
support.
421.
Mr Blair
also emphasised the threat which Iraq might pose in the
future,
which
remained a key part his position in the months that
followed.
422.
Mr Blair
was offering President Bush the UK’s support in an effort
to
influence
his decisions on Iraq while seeking to devise a strategy which
would
command
international support.
423.
The
proposals represented a significant departure from the UK’s
previous
approach.
In essence the strategy entailed renewed demands for Iraq to
comply
with the
obligations imposed by the Security Council and the re-admission
of
weapons
inspectors, and a readiness to respond firmly if Saddam Hussein
failed
to
comply.
424.
The
strategy had multiple diplomatic strands and Mr Blair did not,
at
that stage,
have a ground invasion of Iraq or immediate military action of
any
sort in
mind. But he did state that when a rebellion occurred, the US and
UK
should
“back it militarily”. That was the first step towards a policy of
possible
intervention
in Iraq.
425.
There is no
evidence of any formal consideration of the detailed terms
of
the
strategy for Iraq Mr Blair proposed to President Bush, which went
beyond the
strategy
proposed by the FCO, or its potential implications.
426.
The paper
Mr Blair sent to President Bush on 4 December was not seen
in
advance by
Mr Straw or Mr Hoon although it was sent to them
subsequently.
427.
A number of
issues, including the legal basis for any military action,
would
need to be
resolved as part of developing the “clever strategy”.
382