The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Sir Jeremy
also argued that the term “Occupying Powers” did not have a
negative
connotation
for the Iraqi people when resolution 1483 was adopted, but acquired
it later
when they
were “emotionally encouraged to think of this as
an Occupation, in parallel
with
Palestine” by television stations such as Al Jazeera. He added
“they weren’t angry
because
this was called an Occupation. They were angry because foreign
boots were on
their soil
and life had not been made better.”
A number of
the Inquiry’s Iraqi interlocutors emphasised how much the inclusion
of the
term
“Occupying Powers” within resolution 1483 was
resented.269
A US
official who worked within the CPA explained to the Inquiry that in
the US the term
“Occupation”
had benign connotations of the US’ role in Germany and Japan, but
for Iraqis
it was very
different. There had been a failure on the part of the US and UK to
understand
the baggage
that was associated with the term.270
The Inquiry
asked a number of witnesses about their understanding of whether
the UK
was legally
responsible only for the area of the South-East of Iraq, where it
was physically
in
Occupation, or whether it was jointly responsible for the whole of
Iraq; and whether the
Government
had taken a positive decision that it wished to be considered a
joint occupier
of the
whole of Iraq.
Mr Blair
told the Inquiry that:
“… it was
going to be to our advantage to make sure we were joint partners
with the
US, because
that both gave us a locus in Baghdad but also meant that they
had
some
responsibility for our area too. So I think this was a perfectly
satisfactory way
Mr Straw
gave the Inquiry a contrasting view that:
“… it was
desirable, if legally possible, for us to have authority over that
area which
we
controlled and not more widely … We judged there might be some
advantage
from that
[joint responsibility] for whoever was sitting alongside the Garner
and
then the
Bremer figure in terms of having joint power as well … It would
have been
desirable
if we had had a clear area for which we were responsible without
the
Americans
and got on with it, but you know, it wasn’t to be.”272
When asked
whether there had been a decision by the UK Government to become a
joint
Occupying
Power, Mr Straw said that it followed from the legal advice and
came out of a
process
that would have included conversations with the Attorney
General.
Sir Michael
Wood commented in his statement to the Inquiry that:
“The matter
was far from clear. From the outset of the Occupation, US
military
commanders
started making declarations to the Iraqi people, in the name
of
‘Coalition’,
that were not properly (or at all) cleared with the United Kingdom.
They
soon
established the ‘Coalition Provisional Authority’, an entirely
American creation
in respect
of which the United Kingdom had some (variable) influence but no
control.
There was
thus the appearance of a joint Occupation throughout Iraq, despite
the fact
that the
United Kingdom had no actual authority outside the South-East
…
269
Private
meetings with Iraqi interlocutors.
270
Private
meeting with US interlocutor.
271
Public
hearing, 21 January 2011, page 143.
272
Public
hearing, 2 February 2011, pages 128-132.
204