The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
on 24
March,650
there is no
evidence that any department or individual assumed
ownership
or was assigned responsibility for analysis or mitigation. No
action
ensued.
1446.
In April
2003, Mr Blair set up the Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on
Iraq
Rehabilitation
(AHMGIR), chaired by Mr Straw, to oversee the UK contribution
to
post-conflict
reconstruction (see Section 10.1).
1447.
Until the
creation of the AHMGIR, Mr Straw, Mr Hoon and Ms Short
remained
jointly
responsible for directing post-conflict planning and
preparation.
1448.
In the
absence of a single person responsible for overseeing all
aspects
of planning
and preparation, departments pursued complementary, but
separate,
objectives.
Gaps in UK capabilities were overlooked.
1449.
The FCO,
which focused on policy-making and negotiation, was
not
equipped by
past experience or practice, or by its limited human and
financial
resources,
to prepare for nation-building of the scale required in Iraq, and
did
not expect
to do so.
1450.
DFID’s
focus on poverty reduction and the channelling of
assistance
through
multilateral institutions instilled a reluctance, before the
invasion, to
engage on
anything other than the immediate humanitarian response to
conflict.
1451.
When
military planners advised of the need to consider the
civilian
component
as an integral part of the UK’s post-conflict deployment,
the
Government
was not equipped to respond. Neither the FCO nor DFID
took
responsibility
for the issue.
1452.
The
shortage of expertise in reconstruction and stabilisation was
a
constraint
on the planning process and on the contribution the UK was
able
to make
to the administration and reconstruction of post-conflict
Iraq.
1453.
The UK
Government’s post-invasion response to the shortage of
deployable
experts in
stabilisation and post-conflict reconstruction is addressed
in
Section 10.3.
1454.
Constraints
on UK military capacity are addressed in Sections 6.1 and
6.2.
1455.
The UK
contribution to the post-conflict humanitarian response is
assessed
in Section
10.1.
1456.
At no stage
did Ministers or senior officials commission the
systematic
evaluation
of different options, incorporating detailed analysis of risk and
UK
capabilities,
military and civilian, which should have been required before the
UK
committed
to any course of action in Iraq.
650
Minute
Dodds to
Chancellor, 24 March 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Military Contribution to
Post-Conflict Iraq’.
564