6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
(b) Who will
pay for humanitarian operations? What is the future of OFF
[the
UN‑administered
Oil-for-Food programme]? … Do the US think there is
much
potential
for Iraq to borrow against future oil revenues to fund
reconstruction?
(c)
… What plans
exist for dealing with zones contaminated by the use of
CBW
[chemical
and biological weapons]?
(d)
There will be
a need to move quickly from relief towards
reconstruction and
generating
local Iraqi economic activity … It will be particularly important
to
promote
security and the rule of law at the local level to allow this to
happen.”
•
Political
“We want
S[addam] H[ussein]’s regime replaced with something much
better. How
high should
our level of ambition be in promoting political reform?
… Is
a
western‑style
democracy possible?
…
“We have no
prescription for the shape of a
civilian administration (whether or
not
UN-led). But we shall
want an arrangement that gives the Coalition military
the
freedom to
operate alongside the UN interim administration, without putting
their
forces
under UN command and control … What sort of courts should we have
for
bringing
individuals in SH’s regime to justice?
“A linked
question is the extent to which we replace
Iraqis with international
civilian
staff in the
interim administration. We should probably dismantle
the
security
agencies completely. But many ministries may be turned around with
just
a few
changes at the top … To what extent shall we need to root out
Ba’ath Party
elements?
“The
interim administration will need to set in hand a process
to allow new
political
structures to emerge. We shall
need visible Iraqi participation in such a
process at
an early stage. It should be for the Iraqi people themselves to
produce
the ideas …
although the status within Iraq of many individuals in the
exile
community
is low.”
•
Economic
“The
interim administration will also have an important economic
reconstruction
and reform
task. One of the keys to this will be ensuring that
Iraq’s
oil revenues
are
maximised, consistent with the effect on the global oil market. We
shall need to
consider
whether this is best achieved by returning control of Iraqi oil
exports from
an
international civilian administration to Iraq rapidly or in slower
time …
“To what
extent do we leave the task of promoting
economic reform … to
the IMF/
World Bank?
What is US thinking on rescheduling Iraq’s US$100bn plus
debt?”
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