The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

• Resolution 687 (1991) permitted the conclusion that once the Security Council

was satisfied that Iraq had complied with all its obligations under the resolution,

the authorisation to use force would lapse. But resolution 687 (1991) did not itself

terminate that authorisation, expressly or by inference. That followed from the fact

that the preambular paragraphs (PPs) of resolution 687 (1991) affirmed all the

Security Council’s previous resolutions on Iraq, including resolution 678 (1990).

• A cease-fire is by its nature a transitory measure but, during its duration, the

cease‑fire superseded the ability to implement the authorisation to use force.

The promise contained in the cease-fire to cease hostilities under certain conditions

created an international obligation, which, as long as those conditions pertained,

excluded the recourse to armed force. Under general international law the obligation

created could be terminated only if the conditions on which it had been established

were violated. In other words, the authority to use force had been suspended, but not

terminated. A sufficiently serious violation of Iraq’s obligations under resolution 687

(1991) could withdraw the basis for the cease-fire and re-open the way to a renewed

use of force. That possibility was not limited by the passage of time that had then elapsed.

• Authority to use force could be revived in circumstances where a two-part

pre‑condition was met: the Security Council should be in agreement that there was

a violation of the obligations undertaken by Iraq; and the Security Council considered

the violation sufficiently serious to destroy the basis of the cease-fire.

• Those findings need not be in the form of a resolution, but could be recorded in the

form of a Presidential Statement. But the content must make clear that the Council

considered that the violation of resolution 687 (1991) was such that all means

deemed appropriate by Member States were justified in order to bring Iraq back

into compliance with resolution 687 (1991). Under no circumstances should the

assessment of that condition be left to individual Member States; since the original

authorisation came from the Council, the return to it should also come from that

source and not be left to the subjective evaluation made by individual Member States

and their Governments.

In January 1993, two further serious incidents arose in relation to Iraq’s implementation of

resolution 687 (1991), which led to the adoption of two further Presidential Statements on

8 and 11 January.31

Unlike resolution 707 (1991) and the Presidential Statements in 1992, in which the

warning of serious consequences had been conveyed in indirect language, the statements

in 1993 contained a direct warning of serious consequences. Within days the US, UK and

France carried out air and missile strikes on Iraq.

On 14 January 1993, in relation to military action on the previous day, the UN

Secretary‑General was reported as having said:

“The raid yesterday, and the forces which carried out the raid, have received a

mandate from the Security Council, according to resolution 678 and the cause of

the raid was the violation by Iraq of resolution 687 concerning the cease-fire. So, as

Secretary-General of the United Nations, I can say that this action was taken and

conforms to the resolutions of the Security Council and conforms to the Charter of the

United Nations.”32

31 Presidential Statement, S/25081, 8 January 1993; Presidential Statement, S/25091, 11 January 1993.

32 Paper FCO, 17 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Legal Basis for the Use of Force’.

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