3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
resolutions
can be read as implying a delegation to the United States, with or
without
the United
Kingdom, to take these decisions verges on the
absurd.”300
A range of
views was expressed by speakers during the ensuing
debate.
Lord Mayhew
(Conservative) described the United Nations as “a relatively
new
jurisdiction”.301
The world
was far from having “an article or precedent” for every
situation
it faced.
As a result, there would often be arguments “which it would take
years to litigate
in any
international court to an authoritative conclusion”. He concluded
that UN member
states
“must sometimes have the courage to act when the law may not be
explicitly cut
and dried
and to bear the heavy duty themselves for doing what they
conscientiously
believe to
be necessary and lawful.”
Lord Mayhew
stated that, because the cease-fire established under resolution
687 was
conditional,
it had left resolution 678 undischarged: “in force, but … placed in
abeyance
or
suspension provided Iraq fulfilled its obligations and continued to
fulfil the conditions”.
Because
Iraq had never complied with those conditions, resolution 678 was
no longer
in
abeyance, but available. Those who refused to agree a further
resolution were
entitled to
make that choice, but it could not have the effect of a veto on the
operation
of resolution 678.
Lord
Hannay, a former UK Permanent Representative to the United Nations,
stated that
resolution
1441 had not, on its own, provided authority for the use of force
in the event
of
non-compliance because it had not needed to.302
The
authority already existed in
resolution
687. That there had been Iraqi non-compliance since resolution 687
was “surely
not
seriously in doubt”. That there had been some limited compliance
was not the point.
Unfortunately,
the Security Council had “fallen prey to divided counsels”. The
purpose of
the draft
second resolution had been political, not legal: “to draw a line
under the phase
on
non-compliance with Security Council resolution 1441 and to signal
that serious
consequences
were now imminent.”
Lord Hannay
concluded that military action by the UK, the US and other
allies:
“… does not
herald either a new doctrine bypassing the system laid down in the
UN
Charter,
nor the flouting of international law. In fact, it is far less
daring than was the
decision by
NATO to use force against Yugoslavia in the case of Kosovo
…”
Lord Howell
(Conservative) stated that the question of legality “ought to have
been settled
long before
we reached the point at which the troops are going into
action”.303
There
was
“no doubt”
that the case for intervention had been “poorly put forward”,
adding greatly
to tensions.
Lord Lloyd
of Berwick, a former Law Lord, stated that he found it “impossible
as presently
advised” to
accept the argument offered by Lord Goldsmith in his Written Answer
to
300
House of
Lords, Official
Report, 17 March
2003, columns 69-71.
301
House of
Lords, Official
Report, 17 March
2003, columns 74-76.
302
House of
Lords, Official
Report, 17 March
2003, columns 80-83.
303
House of
Lords, Official
Report, 17 March
2003, column 99.
304
House of
Lords, Official
Report, 17 March
2003, column 108.
549