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3.8  |  Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March 2003
resolutions can be read as implying a delegation to the United States, with or without
the United Kingdom, to take these decisions verges on the absurd.”300
A range of views was expressed by speakers during the ensuing debate.
Lord Mayhew (Conservative) described the United Nations as “a relatively new
jurisdiction”.301 The world was far from having “an article or precedent” for every situation
it faced. As a result, there would often be arguments “which it would take years to litigate
in any international court to an authoritative conclusion”. He concluded that UN member
states “must sometimes have the courage to act when the law may not be explicitly cut
and dried and to bear the heavy duty themselves for doing what they conscientiously
believe to be necessary and lawful.”
Lord Mayhew stated that, because the cease-fire established under resolution 687 was
conditional, it had left resolution 678 undischarged: “in force, but … placed in abeyance
or suspension provided Iraq fulfilled its obligations and continued to fulfil the conditions”.
Because Iraq had never complied with those conditions, resolution 678 was no longer
in abeyance, but available. Those who refused to agree a further resolution were
entitled to make that choice, but it could not have the effect of a veto on the operation
of resolution 678.
Lord Hannay, a former UK Permanent Representative to the United Nations, stated that
resolution 1441 had not, on its own, provided authority for the use of force in the event
of non-compliance because it had not needed to.302 The authority already existed in
resolution 687. That there had been Iraqi non-compliance since resolution 687 was “surely
not seriously in doubt”. That there had been some limited compliance was not the point.
Unfortunately, the Security Council had “fallen prey to divided counsels”. The purpose of
the draft second resolution had been political, not legal: “to draw a line under the phase
on non-compliance with Security Council resolution 1441 and to signal that serious
consequences were now imminent.”
Lord Hannay concluded that military action by the UK, the US and other allies:
“… does not herald either a new doctrine bypassing the system laid down in the UN
Charter, nor the flouting of international law. In fact, it is far less daring than was the
decision by NATO to use force against Yugoslavia in the case of Kosovo …”
Lord Howell (Conservative) stated that the question of legality “ought to have been settled
long before we reached the point at which the troops are going into action”.303 There was
“no doubt” that the case for intervention had been “poorly put forward”, adding greatly
to tensions.
Lord Lloyd of Berwick, a former Law Lord, stated that he found it “impossible as presently
advised” to accept the argument offered by Lord Goldsmith in his Written Answer to
Baroness Ramsey.304
300  House of Lords, Official Report, 17 March 2003, columns 69-71.
301  House of Lords, Official Report, 17 March 2003, columns 74-76.
302  House of Lords, Official Report, 17 March 2003, columns 80-83.
303  House of Lords, Official Report, 17 March 2003, column 99.
304  House of Lords, Official Report, 17 March 2003, column 108.
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