3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
inspections
all over Iraq and to increase aerial surveillance” and its
capabilities were
being increased.
Documents
and interviews
Iraq, “with
a highly developed administrative system”, should have been “able
to provide
more
documentary evidence”.
It was “a
disappointment” that Iraq’s declaration of 7 December 2002 “did not
bring new
documentary
evidence”. Dr Blix hoped that “efforts … including the
appointment of a
governmental
commission” would “give significant results”:
“When
proscribed items are deemed unaccounted for, it is, above all,
credible
accounts
that are needed – or the proscribed items, if they
exist.”
Where
“authentic documents” did not become available, interviews “may be
another way
of
obtaining evidence”. Iraq’s provision of “many names” had prompted
two reflections:
“… with
such detailed information existing regarding those who took part in
the
unilateral
destruction, surely there must also remain records regarding
quantities
and other
data concerning the various items destroyed.
“… with
relevant witnesses available it becomes even more important to be
able to
conduct
interviews in modes and locations, which will allow us to be
confident that
the testimony
is given without outside influence.”
Iraq seemed
“to have encouraged interviewees not to request the presence of
Iraq
officials …
or the taping of interviews” but “conditions ensuring the absence
of undue
influence
were difficult to attain inside Iraq. Interviews outside Iraq might
provide such
assurance.
It is our intention to request such interviews
shortly.”
Thirty-eight
individuals had been asked for interviews and 10 had accepted
UNMOVIC’s
terms,
seven during the last week.
Inspections
Iraq had
denied the existence of mobile production units for biological
weapons and that
proscribed
activities were being conducted underground. Inspections had taken
place at
declared
and undeclared sites but no evidence of proscribed activities had
“so far been
found”.
Iraq was “expected to assist in the development of credible ways to
conduct
random
checks of ground transportation”.
Inspectors
were examining Iraq’s programmes for remotely piloted vehicles and
data was
being
collected to assess the range and other capabilities of the models
found.
In relation
to “reports of proscribed activity conducted underground”, which
Iraq had
denied,
Dr Blix stated that “no facilities for chemical or biological
production or storage
have been
found so far”. Iraq should provide information on any underground
facilities that
were
suitable for the production or storage of weapons of mass
destruction.
Dr Blix
stated that UNMOVIC would need some more staff to monitor
ground
transportation
and to inspect underground facilities, but he:
“… would
rather have twice the amount of high quality information about
sites
to inspect
than twice the number of expert inspectors to send.”
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