The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Planning
for a post‑Saddam Hussein Iraq ......................................................................
78
The failure
to plan or prepare for known risks ..........................................................
78
The
planning process and decision‑making .............................................................
81
The
post‑conflict period ...................................................................................................
86
Occupation ................................................................................................................
86
Looting in
Basra .................................................................................................
86
Looting in
Baghdad ...........................................................................................
88
UK
influence on post‑invasion strategy: resolution
1483 ...................................
89
UK
influence on the Coalition Provisional Authority ...........................................
90
A decline
in security ...........................................................................................
93
The turning
point ................................................................................................
96
Transition ..................................................................................................................
97
UK
influence on US strategy post‑CPA ..............................................................
97
Planning
for withdrawal ......................................................................................
97
The impact
of Afghanistan ..................................................................................
99
Iraqiisation ........................................................................................................
101
Preparation
for withdrawal ......................................................................................
103
A major
divergence in strategy .........................................................................
103
A possible
civil war ...........................................................................................
104
Force Level
Review ..........................................................................................
107
The
beginning of the end .................................................................................
108
Did the UK
achieve its objectives in Iraq? .....................................................................
109
Key
findings ...................................................................................................................111
Development
of UK strategy and options, 9/11 to early January
2002 ....................111
Development
of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 – “axis of
evil” to
Crawford ..................................................................................................................111
Development
of UK strategy and options, April to July 2002 ..................................
112
Development
of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September
2002 ...........
112
Development
of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002 –
the
negotiation
of resolution 1441 .................................................................................
113
Development
of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to
January 2003 .........
113
Development
of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003 .................
114
Iraq WMD
assessments, pre‑July 2002 ..................................................................
115
Iraq WMD
assessments, July to September 2002 ..................................................
116
Iraq WMD
assessments, October 2002 to March 2003 ..........................................
117
The search
for WMD ...............................................................................................
117
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