The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
As the
insurgency developed, the ISG’s operating conditions
became
increasingly
difficult. There was competition for resources between
counter‑terrorism
operations and the search for WMD evidence, and
some ISG staff
were diverted to the former.
•
Mr Blair
took a close interest in the work of the ISG and the
presentation
of its
reports and the wider narrative about WMD. He raised the
subject
with President Bush.
•
The
Government was confident that pre‑conflict assessments of Iraq’s
WMD
capabilities
would be confirmed once Saddam Hussein’s regime had
been
removed.
•
It quickly
became apparent that it was unlikely that significant stockpiles
would
be found.
This led to challenges to the credibility of both the Government
and
the
intelligence community.
•
There were
soon demands for an independent judge‑led inquiry into
the
pre‑conflict
intelligence.
•
The
Government was quick to acknowledge the need for a review,
rejecting
an independent
inquiry in favour of reviews initiated by the House of
Commons
Foreign
Affairs Committee and the Intelligence and Security Committee
of
Parliament.
•
The
Government’s reluctance to establish an independent public inquiry
became
untenable
in January 2004 when President Bush announced his own
decision
to set
up an independent inquiry in the US.
•
Faced with
criticism of the pre‑conflict intelligence and the absence of
evidence
of a
current Iraqi WMD capability, Mr Blair sought to defend the
decision to take
military
action by emphasising instead:
{{Saddam
Hussein’s strategic intent;
{{the
regime’s breaches of Security Council resolutions; and
{{the
positive impact of military action in Iraq on global
counter‑proliferation
efforts.
•
The ISG’s
principal findings – that Iraq’s WMD capability had mostly
been
destroyed
in 1991 but that it had been Saddam Hussein’s strategic
intent
to preserve
the capability to reconstitute his WMD – were significant,
but
did not support
statements made by the UK and US Governments before
the
invasion,
which had focused on Iraq’s current capabilities and an urgent
and
growing
threat.
•
The
explanation for military action put forward by Mr Blair in
October 2004 drew
on the
ISG’s findings, but was not the explanation given before the
conflict.
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